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Federal Judges and the Judicial
Branch: Their Independence and
Accountability
Gordon Bermant"
and
Russell IL Wheeler"
I.

INTRODUCTION

This issue of the Mercer Law Review was stimulated in part by a
concern expressed by some federal judges that federal judicial independence is at risk. For example, the Committee on the Judicial Branch of
the United States Judicial Conference expressed its hope that the
symposium and other efforts will "address the concerns of judges about
the protections afforded to them individually and to the Judiciary as an
institution."' The Committee emphasized that those concerns "extend
beyond the salary and tenure guarantees of the Constitution."' To
* Director, Division of Planning & Technology, the Federal Judicial Center. University
of California at Los Angeles (B.A., 1957); Harvard University (MAk, Ph.D., 1961); George
Mason University (J.D., 1991). The authors are grateful. to Judge William W Schwarzer,
Jeffrey A. Hennemuth, and Thomas E.Willging for their helpful comments and to Suzy
Nguyen for her excellent assistance. The opinions expressed here are only those of the
authors. They do not express positions of the Federal Judicial Center which, on matters
of policy, speaks only through its Board.
** Deputy Director, the Federal Judicial Center. Augustana College (BA, 1965);
University of Chicago (MA., 1968); University of Chicago (Ph.D., 1970).
1. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE CoMMInTrE ON THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 10
(1994). The activity of this committee of the Judicial Conference arose from a resolution
of the judges attending the executive session of the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference on
June 25, 1992. That resolution found that the"historical limited and specialized role" of
the federal courts was threatened by continued legislative federalization of crimes and civil
causes that are traditionally within the ambit of state law. The judges were concerned
that federal courts might be forced to "usurp the role of state courts."
2. Id.
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many judges they also involve legislative and executive intervention into
the operation of the judicial branch and the expansion of federal
jurisdiction and workload. This paper addresses these concerns from a
perspective gained by working within the federal judicial system.
Our purpose is to establish the validity or at least the plausibility of
the following seven claims:
1. "Judicialindependence" is an umbrella term covering several
partially overlapping categories of activity within the judicial role and
judicial branch organization: decisional, personal, procedural, and
administrative.
2. Decisional independence is the sine qua non of thejudicialfunction.
3. Federaljudges do not now generally believe that their decisional
independence is directly threatened from within or from outside of the
judicial branch.
4. Some federal judges are concerned that their procedural and
administrativeindependence are threatened by legislation and executive
intervention.
5. The argument that administrative independence is a necessary
conditionfor the exercise of decisionalindependence is a forceful one, but
support for it comes from sources other than the text of the Constitution
or the history of federaljudicialadministration.
6. Concern over loss of administrative and procedural independence
flows from the widespread perception within the judicial branch that
federaljurisdictionand workload have grown so large that the historical
prestige and quality of the federal bench are at risk.
7. Efforts by the judicialbranch to sustain or increase its administrative andprocedural independence is enhanced by internal organization
that emphasizes and displays strong within-branchaccountability.
Sections II-V, taken together, attempt to establish these seven claims.
Section II defines the framework within which to consider both the scope
of judicial independence and the protection that society should afford its
several categories. Section III deals with decisional independence, noting
that if there are real threats to judges' decisional or personal independence, they would most likely arise through' the operation of procedures
for disciplining and removingjudges. The recent history of congressional
review of judicial discipline and removal, in particular some of the
research conducted for and conclusions of the National Commission on
Judicial Discipline & Removal, suggests that current disciplinary
activities within the branch do not, nor do they appear to, invade judicial
independence in the sense of biasing or coercing judicial decisions in
specific cases.
Section IV concentrates on judicial assessments of branch independence and particularly on the perceived intrusiveness of the legislature
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and executive into the administrative and procedural aspects of judicial
branch function. Some federal judges believe that these perceived
encroachments threaten the long term decisional independence of the
Article I bench.
Branch independence is a relatively new idea. It does not have the
same clear constitutional or historidal antecedents that decisional
independence has. Section V analyzes the idea of branch independence
within the environment in which federal judges currently operate,
attempting to discern whether the administrative and procedural
pressures affecting the judges erode or otherwise detract from their
decisional independence. The analysis suggests that judges see a threat
to branch independence in the expansion of federal jurisdiction and
caseload, with resulting deleterious impacts on the size and institutional
quality of the federal courts. As viewed from within, coping with
problems of ever-increasing size and workload represents the largest
problem facing the federal courts. Other, more detailed complaints
about intrusiveness flow from this root concern. The degree of urgency
of this problem, however, is not shared by many influential actors
outside of the federal judiciary. The lack of shared assumptions makes
communication and problem solving harder than it would otherwise be.
The section concludes with the following conjecture: the success of the
judicial branch in reaching its goal of branch independence may depend
in part on the extent and publicity of judicial accountability that the
branch exercises internally. Appropriately, by its nature within the
constitutional framework, the judicial branch is largely insulated from
the partisan and popular pressures that operate on the political
branches. Congressional and executive intrusions into the administration and procedure of federal courts may be fueled by a perception that
internal judicial branch systems of control and accountability are
insufficient, thus making it necessary for the political branches to
intervene. The unique salary and tenure provisions of the Article IlI
bench create requirements on the members of the bench to act, and to
appear to act, according to the highest standards both on and off the
bench. Maximum independence of the judicial branch from administrative and procedural control by the political branches needs to be
grounded on public perception that the judicial branch accepts and
rigorously enforces those standards in respect to the quality of judicial
decision making, procedural efficiency and safeguards, and administrative economy.
II.

CATEGORIES OF INDEPENDENCE

This section presents a general framework for the discussion ofjudicial
independence. Our analysis is not concerned primarily with the
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Constitution's tenure and salary provisions; rather, we consider what, if
anything, judicial independence requires in addition to secure salary and
tenure 8
In 1978, Judge J. Clifford Wallace identified four categories of judicial
independence. 4 This paper borrows Judge Wallace's categories. We
thus refer to: decisional independence-the judge's authority to decide
law cases based solely on the law and the facts;' personal independence-the judge's freedom to participate, subject to the demands of the
judicial role, in the normal activities of social intercourse; procedural
independence-the judicial branch's authority to devise the rules of
procedure by which the judicial process operates;' and administrative
independence-thejudicial branch's authority to administer itself as a
co-equal and coordinate branch of government."
These four categories aggregate, with some overlap, into the two larger
categories of independence: the independence of the individual judge
and the independence of the judicial branch. Decisional and personal
autonomy vest primarily in the individual judge and secondarily in the
branch, while procedural and logistic autonomy vest primarily in the
branch, through its rule-making powers and governance, and secondarily
in the individual judge.
Decisional independence is the sine qua non ofjudicial independence.
It is important to remember, nevertheless, that decisional independence
is an instrumental, not a fundamental value. Courts do not exist to
provide judges with independence. The Constitution protects judges'
independence, so that they can provide justice impartially. As decisional
independence exists to serve the impartial administration of justice, so
do procedural and administrative independence exist to serve decisional
independence.

3. Thus, the analysis does not apply precisely to federal bankruptcy and magistrate
judges, or to almost all state judiciaries. Rhode Island is the only state which allows
judges to serve for life during good behavior. Massachusetts and New Hampshire also
grant judges life tenure during good behavior, but require them to retire at the age of 70.
New Jersey gives a judge life tenure during good behavior only if he or she has served an
initial 7 years term and then is reappointed by the governor. LARRY BERKSON, SCOT
BELLER & MICHELE GRIMALDI, JUDICIAL SELECTION INTHE UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM
OF PROVISIONS 23-25 (1993).

4. J. Clifford Wallace, JudicialAdministration in a System of Independents:A Tribe
with only Chiefs, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 39, 55-58 (1978) (citing an unpublished manuscript
by J. Covington).

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id,
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M. DECISIONAL INDEPENDENCE
Judges must be able to render decisions in the cases before them free
from both threat of coercion and susceptibility to proffered favor. This
is as true of the trial judge working alone as it is of the appellate judge
working in a panel or en banc. In 1871, the United States Supreme
Court announced the principle, in the context of clarifying limits on
judicial immunity:
It is essential in all courts that the judges who are appointed to
administer the law should be permitted to administer it under the
protection of the law, independently and freely, without favor and
without fear. This provision of the law is not for the protection or
benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public,
whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their
functions with independence, and without fear of consequences."
It is the essence of good judicial process that it is uncontaminated by
pressures for decision beyond those presented by the particular facts and
the applicable law. The salary and tenure protections of the Constitution were intended to secure decisional independence. It is the
decisional independence of federal judges that the nation relies on for
the emergence of its "unlikely heroes" on the bench.' Judicial opinions
are perpetually attacked by editorial writers, national and local officials,
and disgruntled litigants. The constitutional protections ease the judges'
burdens in putting up with these attacks.
Still, our political and legal systems are not designed to make the
independence of judges absolute. Absolute independence, for example,
would require shielding judges absolutely from any susceptibility to
proffered favor. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Presidents may
select Supreme Court Justices and circuit judges from the ranks of
sitting circuit and district judges. A judge hoping for elevation might
conceivably adapt his or her behavior to please those making such
appointments. The risk that a judge would let the desire to curry a
President's favor contaminate the judicial process is deemed too low to
override the assumed benefit to the judicial process that comes from
picking judges with previous federal judicial experience."

9. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 349 n.16 (1871).
10. JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HERoES (1981) (describing the lives and decisions of some of
the judges of the old Fifth Circuit during the 1950s and 1960s).
11. See, e.g., Calabresi & Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or
Separation of Personne?,79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1143 (1994).
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Likewise, there are legal and institutional constraints that discourage
independent judges from doing anything they please. Within the
ordinary course of judicial conduct, the appellate process can rein in
judges whose decisions depart from responsible legal interpretation. For
cases of abuse of the judicial role, the Legislature retains the power of
impeachment and trial, and the executive branch retains the power of
criminal prosecution of judges.' Either of the latter methods could be
used to punish judges who are exercising proper judicial independence
and thus make others afraid to behave with similar independence.
There have been occasional charges that those methods have in fact been
used to limit decisional independence. Jefferson and his followers were
accused of using impeachment to curtail independence, as were, in this
century, opponents of Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas.'
There has been even greater concern that the cumbersome impeachment
process would lead Congress to adopt expedient alternatives.
The greatest potential threat to decisional judicial independence
resides in proposed statutory procedures to remove judges from the
bench-proposals that can trump the Constitution's salary and tenure
protections. How real is that potential threat? The most recent results
of ongoing congressional concern were the establishment and subsequent
report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline & Removal. 4
The Commission completed its work of almost three years with a
comprehensive report and voluminous supporting documents, submitted
to Congress in August 1993."5 The Commission's report contains sixty
conclusions and recommendations addressed separately to constitutional
issues and each of the three branches of government.8 Regarding
impeachment, the Commission concluded unequivocally that any
statutory provision for removing Article III judges by means other than
impeachment and trial (e.g., as a criminal penalty), or for diminishing
the salary of a criminally convicted Article III judge, would be unconstitutional."7 The Commission concluded further, as a matter of policy,

12. Obviously, the judiciary participates in this process through the conduct ofthe trial
and the imposition of a sentence upon conviction.
13. Such accusations have also been made about more recent impeachments and
prosecutions. See, e.g., M. VOLcANsEK, JUDICIAL IMPEAcHmENT (1993).
14. National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§§ 409-10, 104 Stat. 5124 (1990). The Commission was known colloquially by the name of
its chairman, Robert W. Kastenmeier. The Commission comprised 14 members appointed
by the leadership of both houses of the United States Congress, the President, and the
Chief Justice. Id. § 411.
15. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDIcIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL REPORT (1993).
16. Id. at 147-55.
17. Id. at 20-21.
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that no changes in the current constitutional scheme of impeachment
should be attempted.18
The Commission's conclusions represent the most recent stage of a
long debate about the proper procedure for the disciplining of federal
judges and where that authority should reside. Numerous constitutional
and statutory initiatives were introduced in Congress between 1936 and
1991,19 but only two of consequence were enacted. One was the 1939
statute that established each court of appeals as a judicial council to see
that "the work of the district courts shall be effectively and expeditiously
transacted.' ° That law thus regularized somewhat the loose disciplinary authority that circuit judges had exercised over district judges before
1939.21 The other was the 1980 Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, discussed below in more detail.'
Many other proposals failed to pass. In some cases, the initiatives
were prompted by one or more contemporary impeachment proceedings.
Some proposals would have limited the terms of all federal judges, while
others called for automatic removal or suspension of pay upon conviction
of a felony.' What is more important for the present Article is that
many of these proposals would have established procedures within the
judicial branch to undertake a greater and more formal role in the
judicial discipline and removal process-a role greater and more formal
than the circuit councils have ever exercised. These initiatives prompted
distinguished federal judges to present strong defenses of the traditional
form of judicial independence." Opponents of strengthened disciplinary mechanisms were faced with a difficult dilemma: if Congress had the
will to work some change in discipline and removal procedures, would
it be better or worse, for the protection of decisional and branch
independence, to locate the mechanism of that change within the judicial

18. Id. at 22-26.
19. 1d at 157-61.
20. An Act to Provide for the Administration of the United States Courts, and for Other
Purposes, ch. 501, § 306, 53 Stat. 1223, 1224 (1939)
21. § 306, 53 Stat. at 1224.
22. See supra note 14, and infra text with notes 28-39.
23. S. 52, 104th Cong., 1st Seas. (1995). Senator Thurmond has introduced this
legislation to that end in the 104th Congress: A Bill to Provide that a Justice or Judge
Convicted of a Felony Shall be Suspended from Office Without Pay.
24. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and
Workload of FederalJudges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1983); Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Judicial
Independence, 40 ALA. LAWYER 15 (1979); Irving R. Kaufmnan, Chilling Judicial
Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681 (1979); Edward D. Re, Judicial Independence and
Accountability: The JudicialCouncils Reform and JudicialConduct and DisabilityAct of
1980, 8 N. KY. L. REv. 221 (1981); J. Clifford Wallace, JudicialAdministration in a System
of Independents: A Tribe with only Chiefs, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 39 (1978).
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branch?' The question of the limit of circuit judicial council authority
over the work of an active judge had reached the Supreme Court in
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit,' but the Court's
decision in the case did not provide guidance for councils generally."
A. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
DisabilityAct of 1980
The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
of 19 8 0' authorizes "[alny person alleging that [any federal judge] has,
engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, or alleging that [such judge] is
unable to discharge all the duties of office by reason of mental or
physical disability," to complain in writing through the office of the clerk
of the court of appeals of the circuit in which the judge sits.'m The Act
further specifies how the chief circuit judge and, if necessary, the circuit
judicial council, are to respond to the complaint.'m The Act empowers
the judicial council to impose several actions including certification of
disability, a request to the judge that he or she retire, a freeze for a
specified time on the assignment of new cases to the judge, and private
or public censure or reprimand; however, the council may not under any
circumstance order the removal of a district or circuit judge. 31
One of the major tasks of the Commission was to assess the courts'
activities pursuant to the 1980 Act. In support of this task, Jeffrey Barr
and Thomas Willging summarized data filed by the courts with the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts about the 2405
complaints brought under 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) between 1980 and 1991.32

25. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 24, at 710-16 (arguing that the largely informal
means of judicial discipline then in place within the branch should not be enhanced by
more formal process; such process, a "Trojan horse," would turn judges against each other
and destroy the collegiality essential to sound judicial decision making).
26. 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
27. Id.
28. Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (effective Oct. 1, 1981). The disciplinary
features of the Act are codified at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1982), as amended in 1990.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1).
30. Id. § 372(cX3)-(17).
31. Id. § 372(cX6XB)(i-vii).
32. Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, DecentralizedSelf.Regulation,Accountability, and JudicialIndependence Under the Federal Judicial Conduct and DisabilityAct of
1980, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 25 (1993).

19951

JUDGES AND THE JUDICIAL BRANCH

843

Their summary table is provided in the footnote. ' Barr and Willging
also reported a thorough analysis of a sample of 469 complaints drawn
from the entire corpus of reported complaints." Barr and Willging's
study "revealed no matter that can be considered to have directly
interfered with or seriously threatened independent judicial decisionmaking,"'

though they found "two instances ...

that appeared to

implicate judicial independence." ' These two arose from complaints
made by parties about the judges' comments during sentencing
hearings.37 Barr and Willging noted that calling judges to account for
such conduct implicates their independence to speak from the bench
about matters pertinent to the case.3' These cases were resolved when
the judges took corrective action to the satisfaction of the chief circuit
judge. 39
It seems, then, that the internal disciplinary powers available to the
courts under the 1980 Act, as implemented, have neither chilled
decisional independence nor, so far as is reported, reduced judicial
collegiality. Further, because the discipline is exercised entirely within
the branch, the 1980 Act has not eroded judicial branch independence.
We will return to this matter in Section IV.
There are also forms of review or oversight by appellate courts that,
some might argue, trench on the decisional or personal independence of

33. Reported § 372(c) Filingsand Outcomes of Complaints, All Circuits and National
Courts, 1980-1991 (N=2405).
Outcome
Complaints Filed
Withdrawn Before Chief Judge Action
Unknown or Incomplete Data
Dismissed by Chief Judge
CorrectiveAction Taken
Action No Longer Necessary
JudicialCouncil Dismissal
Incomplete Data (JudicialCouncil Level)
Judge Reprimanded
Judge Impeached
Voluntary Retirement
Voluntary Retirement & Certification of Disability
Id at 52, Table 9.
34. Id. at 60-61.
35. Id. at 177.
36. Id. at 180.
37. Id. at 176-77.
38. Id. at 177.
39. Id. at 176-77.

Number
2405
16
129
2143
73
4
27
4
5
1
1
2

Balance
2405
2389
2260
117
44
40
13
9
4
3
2
0
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district judges. Sometimes these have followed on judges making
controversial comments that caused the court of appeals to act to
preserve the court's reputation for impartiality in appearance as well as
in fact.' In another case, a judge was required by the appellate court
to justify his decision in a case in a form that, he argued, was not
required by federal rule."' More generally, granting the extraordinary
writs of mandamus or prohibition represents a departure from typical
judicial review and a direct imposition on the conduct of the judge below
by the reviewing court.42 Judicial discipline exercised through the
channel of the appellate courts is in any event rare in the federal courts
and has not raised widespread alarm about judicial independence among
Article III judges.
In sum, when judicial independence is divided into its natural parts,
decisional independence emerges naturally as the indispensable category
that all agree must be vigilantly guarded for the sake of supporting
impartial judges who may make decisions that create considerable
controversy and intense animosity. The salary and tenure provisions of
the Constitution accomplish that task for judges appointed under Article
III.' Article III also limits the exercise of the judicial power of the
United States to judges appointed with Article III protections."
Statutory developments that require some judges to exercise discipline
over colleagues who have acted prejudicially to the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts have not reduced
the decisional independence of federal judges.
IV. BRANCH INDEPENDENCE

Decisional independence is not under greater attack than heretofore;
yet there remains a current of complaint among federal judges,
somewhat inchoate to be sure, that their independence is being
diminished. It appears that the sources of concern must be about
procedural and administrative, rather than decisional or personal,

40. See Haines v. Liggett Group. Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992); Gardiner v. A.H.
Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 799 F. Supp.
466 (D.NJ. 1992); Andrea Sachs, Judge Forced Off Tobacco Suit, A.BA.J. Nov. 1992, at
16.
41. Fairhead v. Deleuw, Cather & Co., 817 F. Supp. 153, 153 (D.D.C. 1993). See also
Mark Hansen, Illinois CapsAppellate Opinions, 80 A.BA.J., at 36 (1994). In June, 1994,
the Illinois Supreme Court ordered a limit on the number and length of opinions the
Illinois appellate courts may issue. Id.
42. See, e.g., La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); JOHN J. COUND ET AL.,
CIvIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 1025-32 (4th Ed. 1985).
43. U.S. CONST. art. IH, § 1.
44. Id.
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independence, or, more subtly, about how any such infringements will
come to erode decisional independence. This section concentrates on this
perception ofjudges that, as an institution, the judicial branch is subject
to increasing control and intrusiveness by the legislature and the
executive. The term "branch independence," comprising procedural and
administrative independence, identifies the locus, but not the source, of
the concern.
Judicial branch independence refers to the freedom of the branch to
operate according to procedural rules and administrative machinery that
it fashions for itself through its own governance structures. Those
structures were put in place in 1939, when Congress removed administrative authority over the federal courts from the Department of Justice
and placed it in the newly created Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, which was to function under the "direction and supervision" of what is now called the Judicial Conference of the United
States.' Attorney General Homer Cummings, who worked with the
judicial leadership to design the new system, told Congress that the
change boiled down to a simple proposition: "Let the judges run the
judiciary'
Decisional independence is not absolute, and branch independence is
less so. The phrase often used by the Supreme Court to describe the
relationship between the branches is "separateness but interdependence,
There are no well-accepted arguments
autonomy but reciprocity.'
that the judicial branch should have the same near total independence
to govern itself that individual judges must have in deciding a case or

45. See RUSSELL R. WHEELER & GORDON BERMANT, JUDICIAL BRANCH GOVERNANCE:
WHY CONGRESS SHOULD-AND WHY CONGRESS SHOULD NCT-CREATE A FULL-TIME
EXEcuTivz JUDGE, ABOLISH THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, AND REMOVE CIRCUIT JUDGES

FROM DISTRICT COURT GOVERNACE (Federal Judicial Center 1994).
46. Hearingsbefore the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on S. 3212,
A Bill to Establish the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and for other
Purposes, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. at 31 (1938).
47. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also

contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.
It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."
Id. The language has been cited in subsequent important separation of powers cases,
including eg., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,381 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 694 (1988); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954
(1983); and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976). Most recently, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in his 1994 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, used Justice Jackson's

language as the basis of his discussion of relations between the judiciary and Congress.
Chief Justice Rehnquist Reflects on 1994 in Year-End Report, 27 THE THIRD BRANCH 1
(January, 1995) (containing the text of the Chief Justice's ninth annual year-end report).
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controversy. For example, the necessary degree of branch independence
does not require that judges have the sole or even the major role in
determining the annual appropriation of tax dollars that operate the
courts." Settled constitutional practice demonstrates that branch
independence is consistent with Congress's exercise of its authorization,
appropriation, and oversight powers, as well as its authority to regulate
judicial rule-making authority,49 internal, disciplinary procedures,"
and general administrative operations.
When Judge Wallace reviewed concerns related to judicial independence in 1978, he concluded that matters involving only logistical or
administrative matters were not at that time 'viewed as inimical to
judicial independence."' Our view of the present landscape suggests
that such matters are now more salient to members of the life-tenured
bench. The following paragraphs present examples of the issues as seen
from within the federal courts.
A. Placing or Returning Functions to the Third Branch
On March 13, 1995, the Judicial Conference of the United States
received from its Committee on Long Range Planning the committee's
Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts.5 2 Recommendations
in the proposed plan organized under the heading of Administrative
Autonomy are undergirded by the policy position that the courts, as a coequal branch of government, should operate with "all reasonable
autonomy.'
The plan identifies three programs over which the
judiciary should exercise significantly greater control: the judicial space

48. We do not take up the question of inherent powers litigation. See Jeffrey Jackson,
JudicialIndependence,Adequate CourtFunding,and InherentJudicialPowers, 52 MD. L.
REv. 217 (1993) (reviewing inherent powers litigation in the state courts).
49. See Linda S. Mullenix, Judicial Powerand The Rules EnablingAct, 46 MERCER L.
REV. 733 (1995).
50. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCUINE & REMOVAL, supra note 15, at 22-26
(provides the most recent review of federal judicial discipline conducted pursuant to
statute).
51. Wallace, supra note 4, at 55. Judge Wallace did note one historical concern that
logistical or housekeeping matters are essential for the core judicial function, citing to the
dispute in 1932 over the continuation of the position of messenger for federal judges. Id.
at 55. For another view of what "housekeeping" means in judicial administration, see
Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Natureand Allocation of Work in Federal Trial Courts,
24 GA. L. REV. 909 (1990).
52. COMMTTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNTED
STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL CouRTs (March 1995) thereinafter
PROPOSED PLAN). The Conference also established a procedure for subsequent review and
debate of the proposed plan's recommendations.
53. Id. at 79.
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and facilities program, which currently resides largely with the General
Services Administration; the court and judicial security program, which
currently rests largely with the Marshal's Service of the Justice
Department; and bankruptcy estate administration, once a third branch
function but now primarily resident in the Office of the United States
Trustee in the Justice Department." These recommendations arose
from a context of concern that has been expressed by leading members
of the federal bench for some time. In respect to the transfer of
bankruptcy estate administration from the courts to the Department of
Justice in 1986, for example, the then chair of the Bankruptcy Committee of the Judicial Conference testified before a Senate committee that
"[E]ach branch of the government has 'administrative functions' ...
which are integrally related to their performance of... duties. As a
matter of policy, we should be cautious in over-involving one branch of
In
the Government in the 'administrative functions' of another.'
regard to the control of courtroom construction, the chair of the Space
and Facilities Committee of the Conference testified that
[a]s a separate branch of government, the Federal Judiciary believes
that it should have a direct relationship with the Congress about space
and facilities, as it does about other matters. Decisions about what
courthouses should be built, when, and at what cost, should be made
between the Congress and the Judiciary; the Executive Branch should
not set the agenda as it does now .... I want to emphasize that our
request for legislative relief is not made lightly. It is made to correct
deep-rooted, systemic problems caused by the Judiciary's total dependence on the Executive Branch-and on the Executive Branch's
processes and procedures-to provide facilities essential to the conduct
of Judicial business.'
Thus, the argument in these instances is that the lack of administrative autonomy within the judiciary negatively affects the essential,
integral judicial function, making judicial decisions.

54. Id.
55. The United States Trustee System: Hearingon S. 1961 Before the Subcomm. on
Courtsof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 111 (1986) (testimony
of Robert Demascio, Judge, U.S. District Court, District of Eastern Michigan; Chairman,
Committee on the Administration of the Bankruptcy System, Judicial Conference of the
United States).
56. JudicialSpace and FacilitiesManagement Act: Hearings on S. 2070 Before the
Subcomm. on WaterResources, Transportation,and Infrastructureof the Senate Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 102d Cong., 2d Sees. 3, 52 (1992) (testimony of Robert

Broomfield, Chairman, Space and Facilities Committee, Judicial Conference of the United

States).
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B.

The Budget: Size and Authority
Judges express two different but related concerns about the process of
fixing the federal courts' annual appropriation.5 7 The first is whether
Congress might diminish the quality of federal court decision-making by
failing to increase judicial branch appropriations in proportion to
increases in work load created by legislation expanding federal
jurisdiction. This concern has been expressed by judges even while
acknowledging generous congressional funding," and it moved into the
press in a 1992 Washington Post op-ed article by former federal judge
Charles Clark, who had been Chief Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and chair in turn of the Budget Committee
and Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference." Judge Clark
argued that Congressional under-funding of the judiciary's budget
request would create a crisis of Constitutional proportions in the
provision of criminal and civil jury trials: funds to support criminal jury
trials guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be depleted by March,
1993, and funds to support civil jury trials guaranteed by the Seventh
Amendment would vanish in August of that year. 0
Under these
conditions, judges would be forced to delay trials or deny them, in
apparent violation of the Constitution, for purely administrative
reasons."' The judges' control of essential aspects of their courtrooms
would have been overtaken by budgetary decisions."
The second concern of judges relates to the handling of the judiciary's
annual request to Congress for appropriations. Each year, the federal
courts forward their request to the Office of Management and Budget for
inclusion, as a matter of convenience, into the overall proposed budget
that the President sends to Congress in January. The President has a

57. Jackson, supra note 48, has reviewed separation of powers questions in regard to
the budgets of state judiciaries.
58. E.g., Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriationsfor 1993. HearingsBefore a Subcommittee of the Committee on
AppropriationsHouse ofRepresentatives,102nd Congress, 2nd Sees. 374 (1992) (statement
of Richard S. Arnold, Chairman, Budget Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
United States).
59. Charles Clark, Stiffing the FederalCourts,WASHINGTON PosT, September 18,1992,
at A10.
60. Id. See also Stephen Labaton, Federal Judges Blame Money Woes for Slowdown,
N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 1993, at B16. For Judge Clark's views on systemic solution to the
problem of the federal court workload, see Charles Clark, Mules and Wagons--A Pleafor
JurisdictionalReform, 14 MIss. COL. L. REv. 263 (1994).
61. Clark, supra note 59, at A10.
62. Id, In the event, Congress provided additional funds in a supplemental
appropriation.
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statutory obligation to forward the judiciarys budget request to Congress
without change.6e
Autonomy in appropriations submission is a
fundamental element of the branch independence achieved in 1939.
Chief Judge John Parker said at the time that "it is in conflict with the
division of powers which the Constitution contemplates to allow the
executive department to formulate the budget for the judiciary.""
There is, moreover, a long tradition that executive branch officials will
not "comment" to Congress on the judiciary's request; in 1979, in fact,
the then-chair of the House subcommittee with authority over the
judiciary's request stated that he could not "recall that the OMB has
ever exercised its right under the law to comment on the budget of the
federal judiciary'
More recently, the judiciary has indicated its
understanding that it has a firm promise by the OMB that the Office
would not use its position to comment on the judiciarys budget
request.66
Judges and court officials took issue in 1993 when the OMB packaged
the Administration's budget-cutting goals along with the budget itself in
the submission to Congress; the Administration's document contained a
reference to an eighteen percent cut in the judiciary's proposed budget
and thus appeared, if not to recommend a change, certainly to offer a
comment. Judge Richard Arnold, chair of the Budget Committee of the
Judicial Conference, stated that the event was "disturbing because it has
all sorts of implications for judicial independence ....
We are an
independent branch of government, with a status different from ...
somebody that's part of the executive establishment. 7
The language of the Long Range Planning Committee's proposed plan
reflects these concerns. The plan calls for all responsibility for
developing and presenting the courts' budget to Congress to remain
"solely within the judicial branch.s The text supporting the recom-

63. 28 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp. VI 1994) (directing the Director of the Administrative Office
to submit the courts' appropriations request to the Office of Management and Budget); 31
U.S.C. § 1105(b) (Supp. VI 1994) (directing the President to submit the judiciary's proposed
budget to Congress "without change).
64. Hearingsbefore the Committee on the Judiciaryof the House of Representatives,on
H.R. 2973, subsequently amended and reintroduced as H.R. 5999, A Bill to Providefor the
Administrationof the United States Courts, and for Other Purposes,76th Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 20 (1939). See also the testimony by Alexander Holtzoff, then-special assistant to
Attorney General Cumming. Id. at 48-49.
65. J. Slack, Commentary-Funding the Federal Judiciary, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 8
(1979).
66. Eva M. Rodriguez, Judges to OMB: Butt Out of Budget, LEGAL Tom OF
WASHINGTON, July 5, 1993, at 1.
67. Id. at 23.
68. PROPOSED PLAN, supra note 52, at 80.
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mendation observes that "there have been and may continue to be efforts
by executive branch to protect the funding of other federal programs at
the expense of the courts. If the courts are to perform their constitutional mission, these efforts must be resisted.' 9
C. Legislative Control of JudicialDiscretion: The Sentencing
Guidelines, MandatoryMinimum Sentences, and the Civil Justice
Reform Act
Some judges contend that legislation that reduces discretion in judicial
decision-making is a reduction in their independence. They have argued
vigorously against the changes in criminal sentencing policy introduced
by the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act and the sentencing guidelines issued
pursuant to it, and by the increasing number of congressionally-imposed
mandatory minimum sentences.7 While some judges' objections have
been leveled against the new sentencing severity,71 others have objected
that such strict control over sentencing perverts the exercise of
appropriate decisional independence:
Finally-somewhat paradoxically-federal trial judges themselves
retain substantial discretion over sentencing decisions, despite the
presence of the guidelines, but they are now permitted to exercise this
discretion only by performing elaborate gyrations within the confines
of the guidelines calculations. This element of judicial discretion
within a purportedly mandatory system of rules produces a game of tug
of war between the bureaucracy and the bench, as the Sentencing

69. Id. at 81.

70. The sentencing guidelines are promulgated by the United States Sentencing
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988). Whether the
rigid structure of the guidelines is perceived as an infringement of decisional or branch
independence, or both, is unclear, in part because the status of the Commission in relation
to -intra-branch" and "inter-branch" distinctions is ambiguated by terms of the Commission's organic statute, which creates the body as "an independent commission in the
judicial branch of the United States" all of whose members are appointed by the President
with advice and consent of the Senate, except that three of members must be Federal
judges "selected after considering a list of six judges recommended to the President by the
Judicial Conference .... " Id. § 991(a). Indeed, the structure and membership of the
Commission caused a Constitutional challenge on separation of powers grounds; the
Commission withstood the challenge. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
71. Judge Spurns Rule on Sentencing; Rejects 17 -Year Term for Drugs, N.Y. TIMES,

Jan. 27, 1991, Sec. 1, at 18. "AFederal judge in San Diego, J. Lawrence Irving, resigned
last year, saying he could not continue to impose the harsh sentences mandated by the
guidelines.- Id.
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Commission struggles to incorporate or repudiate the exceptions
articulated by individual judges or appellate courts."

The draft long range plan addresses this concern by encouraging
Congress not to prescribe mandatory minimum sentences and the
Sentencing Commission to provide judges with greater flexibility in
fixing terms of punishment.7 3

Finally, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,' 4 including the so-called
civil justice expense and delay reduction plans, which the act requires
each district court to develop on the advice of a bench-bar committee,"

is perceived by some federal judges as legislative micro-management and
an undue encroachment on procedural independence. One judge
commented on a draft version of the act:
I have concluded that this bill interferes with both the integrity and
independence of our Article III courts. I oppose it not only because it
may raise constitutional issues but also because it is bad policy ...
[flederal judges almost unanimously oppose this legislation not only
because they deem it unnecessary but because they honestly believe it
will increase costs and delays rather than reduce such costs and delays
.... The tendency for the Legislative Branch to micro-manage the
Judicial Branch should be resisted by those who truly see the value of
an independent judiciary/6

The draft long range plan comprehends this concern when it recommends that rules regulating correct procedure "should be developed
exclusively in accordance with the time-tested and orderly process
established by the Rules Enabling Act." 7
72. CabranesRips Sentencing Rules, LEGAL TIMES OF WASHINGTON, April 11, 1994, at
21. Federal judges expressed widespread dissatisfaction with the guidelines in responding
to a survey conducted by the Federal Judicial Center for the Judicial Conference
Committee on Long Range Planning. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PLANNING FOR THE
FUTURE: RESULTS OF A 1992 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER SURVEY OF UNITED STATES
JUDGES, at 15, 37 (1994) [hereinafter SURVEY).
73. PROPOSED PLAN, supra note 52, at 45-46.
74. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
75. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. V 1993).
76. FederalCourts Study Committee ImplementationAct and Civil Justice Reform Act:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property,and the Administration of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 431-433 (1990)
(statement of Judge G. Thomas Eisele, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas). The bill as enacted did not contain some of the provisions
most offensive to federal judges. For a vigorous critique of the CJRA, see Mullenix, supra
note 49. The debate about the CJRA echoes one of two decades ago over the legislative
requirement that each district adopt and implement a "Speedy Trial Plan" to implement
the Speedy Trial Act.
77. PROPOSED PLAN, supra note 52, at 44.
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The judiciary's grievances against infringements on administrative
and procedural independence have arisen within a context of expanding
federal jurisdiction and, in most courts, judicial workloads. The rising
workload has raised judicial concerns that the growth will affect the
quality of the courts' work. The results of the Federal Judicial Center's
1992 survey of judges' opinions on planning issues provides support for
this claim. For example, eighty-one percent of the Article III judges who
returned the survey reported that the volume of criminal cases was
either a moderate, large, or grave problem; sixty-seven percent of the
responding judges held the same opinions about the volume of civil
cases.78 To take another example, one of the major action items on the
agenda of the Judicial Conference of the United States in 1993 was a
request by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that
the Conference ask Congress to add ten new judgeships to the court's
existing complement of twenty-eight. 7 . Opposition among judges on
and off the Judicial Conference prompted intense and extended debate' °
that culminated finally in a Conference decision to recommend that
Congress create these judgeships on a temporary basis, i.e., that for each
new judgeship an existing judgeship would lapse upon the death or
retirement of its incumbent.8 ' At the same time the Conference
reaffirmed its adherence to the principle that federal courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction and that the Article III judiciary should be
"relatively small.8
V.

"A SEPARATE WAY OF LIFE AND WORK": BRANCH INDEPENDENCE

Now AND IN THE NEAR FUTURE
How is one to assess the claim by judges that the judicial branch itself
needs independence in order to protect the operation of the judicial
function? Compared to the matter of decisional independence, the claim
for branch independence has a much more tenuous grounding in

78. SURVEY, supra note 72, at 3, 25. For the volume of criminal cases, 679/827 judges;
for the volume of civil cases, 557/827 judges. Id. Eighty-four percent of all Article III
judges serving at the time of the survey responded to it. Id. at iii.
79. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
51 (1993).
80.

See GORDON BERMANT, WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER, EDWARD SUSSMAN & RUSSELL R.

WHEELER, IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES: ANALYSIS OF
ARGUMENTS AND IMPuCATIONS (Federal Judicial Center, 1993).
81. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
51(1993). Congress has created numerous temporary appellate judgeships over the years;
all have eventually been made permanent. As of the date ofthis writing, Congress has not
acted on the request for 10 temporary judgeships.
82. Id.
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constitutional history. The founding generation proclaimed the value of
life tenure and irreducible salaries for judges in both the Declaration of
Independence' and the Constitution, and Hamilton's defense of those
provisions in Federalist 78 remains very much on point today.8" By
contrast, there seems to have been almost no notion of branch independence in the late eighteenth century' As indicated elsewhere in this
volume," the current institutional apparatus that today may be
required to protect the decisional independence of federal judges was not
part of any original understanding in the early days of the republic or,
indeed, until well into the twentieth century. As Calabresi and Larsen
put it, "the idea that the judiciary was a wholly independent and coequal
department with the other two did not have deep roots in America at the
time of [the Constitution's] drafting."'
Tb the authors of the Constitution and the 1789 Judiciary Act, rather,
there appeared to be very little notion that the judicial branch comprised
anything more than a group of judges and the clerks of court who
managed the papers filed in litigation, and no notion that judicial
independence required more than the salary and tenure provisions of
Article III. The First Judiciary Act established the district and circuit
courts and their geographic boundaries,' specified the times and places
of holding court,s and authorized the courts to prescribe procedural
rules not inconsistent with the laws of the United States." The
judicial power, to be sure, was a power separate from the legislative and
executive power-Hamilton referred to "the different departments of
power"9 -but the concept of a separate, independent judicial branch as
an administrative entity was not present. The first federal judicial
system had no independent administrative apparatus except for the
authority of each court to appoint its own clerk.'

83. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 11 (U.S. 1776). The ninth of 18 indictments
of the King was that "He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure of
their Offices, and the Amount and Payment of their Salaries." Id.
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
85. The ideas presented in this section have additional exposition in RUSSELL
WHEELER, JUDICIAL ADMnISTRATION: ITS RELATION TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (1988).
86. See Martin H. Radish, FederalJudicialIndependence: Constitutionaland Political
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697 (1995).
87. Calabresi & Larsen, One Person, One fice: Separationof Powers or Separation
of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1128 (1994).
88. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2, 4, 1 Stat. 73, 76.
89. Id. §§ 3, 5.
90. Id. § 17.
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
92. See supra note 88, § 7.
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The early federal judicial system was essentially a small group of
judges, some serving part-time,' administered in turn by the Treasury
Department until the 1840s,94 then by the Interior Department," and
then by the Justice Department upon its creation in 18 7 0." Furthermore, numerous statutes of the early Congress made federal district
judges, in effect, agents of the executive departments." They evidently
complied, in one way or another, not only with the well-known directive
to Supreme Court Justices, sitting as circuit judges, to examine
Revolutionary War veterans for pension eligibility," but also with other
statutes that, in effect, made federal judges hearing examiners for nonjudicial officials in the nation's capital. 9
The authors of the court's draft long range plan note that "[flor the
federal court system to operate with the autonomy required of a co-equal
branch of government, it should not be required to rely on executive

93. See, e.g., JOHN P. FRANK, JUSTICE DANIEL DISSENTING: A BIOGRAPHY OF PETER V.
DANIEL, 1784-1860 (1964).
94. Act of March 3, 1849, ch. 108, § 4, 9 Stat. 395. Congress directed the Treasury
Department to prescribe *the forms of keeping and rendering all public accounts
whatsoever," thus making the Department responsible for what little financial administration of the courts occurred in the earlier years. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 37, § 9, 1 Stat. 279,
281. By like token, the Department exercised responsibility for other aspects of federal
administration that were later transferred to other, more appropriate agencies. Department
of the Treasury, A National Historic Landmark (GPO, 1972) at 5.
95. Act of March 3, 1849, ch. 108, § 4, 9 Stat. 395.
96. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 15, 16 Stat. 164.
97. See infra notes 98-99.
98. Act of March 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 244. The assignment was to Supreme Court
justices sitting as circuit judges. Id. The judges refused to do so in their judicial capacity
in a series of cases generally reported under the style of Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
408,409 n.a (1792), although they agreed to regard the statute as appointing them pension
"commissioners for the purposes mentioned in it, by official instead of personal description."
2 Dall. at 409 n.a (quoting an unidentified New York circuit court opinion).
99. See, e.g., Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 131 (federal judges were directed to
receive and evaluate maritime exports reports of unsafe vessels); Act of May 26, 1790, ch.
12 § 1, 1 Stat. 122 (federal judges to investigate claims of remission for fines or forfeitures
imposed for unintentional violation of the customs laws and report their findings to the
Treasury Secretary, who would decide whether to remit the penalties); Act of April 14,
1792, ch. 24, § 1, 1 Stat. 254 (federal judges to protect wrecked ships from unwarranted
seizure by salvagers); Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 2, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (federal judges to
receive copies of the votes of presidential electors for safe keeping); Act of January 23,
1798, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 537 (federal judges to hold hearings of contested elections and forward
their findings to Congress); Act of January 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 (federal judges to
receive aliens' applications for naturalization and investigate their character, something
at the time that was more than a mere ministerial act). Russell Wheeler, Extrqjudicial
Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 S. CT. REV. 123, 131-39 (1973).
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' As the plan recognizes,
branch agencies for administrative support. " °°
this is a mid-twentieth century concept. Those who established the
system of separation of powers, including an independent judiciary, were
content to allow judges and their clerks to rely on executive branch
support. Moreover, they made the judges agents of the executive. The
idea of a truly independent judicial branch, administratively responsible
and competent, even if not administratively autonomous, emerged only
in the twentieth century as a product of the Progressive Movement's
effort to rationalize government and make it more efficient. Tb that end,
wrote Roscoe Pound, Louis Brandeis, and others, in 1914, "the court
should be given control of the clerical and administrative force through
a chief clerk, [appointed by and] responsible to the court for the conduct
of this part of the work." 1 The notion of a separate administrative
governance machinery for the courts emerged gradually from those
beginnings. In 1939, Congress agreed to the judiciary's request that
administration of the courts be transferred from the Department of
Justice to an Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which
was to operate under the supervision and direction of what is now the
Judicial Conference of the United States.'°2 And even in 1939, the
judges' argument for a separate administration was based both on
constitutional and efficiency grounds.' 3
That the creators of the federal judiciary fashioned the institution as
they did hardly means that those late eighteenth century elements are
consistent with an independent judiciary in the twenty-first century It
only means that we can find little guidance in the views of the founders
for the concept and elements of administrative judicial independence as
they present themselves to us today. Rather, it might be better to argue
that the 20th century has completed the evolution ofjudicial administration protections begun with the Constitution's tenure and salary clauses,
an evolution that was largely dormant through the entire nineteenth
century and some of the twentieth.
Protection of branch independence, however, needs more than appeals
to concepts of co-equal branches of government. The unique institutional
character of the federal judiciary is eloquently captur'ed by Senior Judge

100. PROPOSED PLAN, supra note 52, at 66.
101. C. Eliot, M. Storey, L. Brandeis, A. Rodenbeck & R Pound, Preliminary Report
on Efficiency in the Administration of Justice (1914), reprinted in R. Wheeler & H.
Whitcomb, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1977), at 52.
102. An Act to Provide for the Administration of the United States Courts, and for
Other Purposes, ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223 (1939).
103. See PETER G. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMMSTRATION chs. 3-4
(1973).
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Frank M. Coffin of the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit:
Drawn from the busy thoroughfares of the practice or teaching of law,
or service in politics in local, state, or national government, judges
become strangers in our midst. Theirs is a separate way of life and
work.
... Their most elusive mission is that of safeguarding individual rights
in a majoritarian
society with due regard to the legitimate interests of
1 4

that society. 0

Judge Coffin's reference to "a separate way of life and work" tells us that
the federal judicial role requires separation of judges from the "busy
thoroughfares" on which the judges had previously traveled and
generally flourished.' The prudential restrictions placed on federal
judges by the Code of Conduct, for example, are greater than those
imposed on persons in business or attorneys in private practice. 1' But
"a separate way of life and work"10' also suggests that taking the
judicial role permits and supports the same separation by providing
measures of power, respect, prestige, and, backed by constitutional
guarantees, lifetime financial security that other travelers on the "busy
thoroughfares"' do not receive. The demands placed on judges for
complete adherence to the rule of law, for remaining above fear and
favor in fact and appearance, are compensated for by relieving judges
from worrying about their security and from performing many of the
compromises and obediences that the rest of the population endure in
the workplace. The financial and other benefits attached to the
responsible exercise of the judicial power of the United States must be
worth the costs that the judicial occupation inevitably extracts from its
incumbents, or else the incumbents will, finally, serve the republic
poorly. Judges are already subject to public criticism from those whose
interests have not been served by the judges' exercise of decisional
independence. The attractiveness of the judicial occupation is further
reduced when the separation that is both a cost and a benefit of the
judicial role is abruptly, unilaterally, or disrespectfully abridged by acts
of the other branches of government. On this view, any legislation or
executive intervention that increases oversight over procedural or
104. FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 249 (1980).
105. Id

106. See JUDICJAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED
STATES JUDGES (1994).
107. COFFIN, supra note 104.

108. Id.
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administrative activity in the judicial branch will, when judges are
already concerned about the erosion of their unique positions in
American public life, further elevate judicial apprehension that the
independence of the third branch is under siege--even though there are
no direct attacks on the freedom of judges to decide cases strictly
according to their readings of the facts and the law.
Many judges thus perceive congressional and executive branch
initiatives that are, presumably, intended to enhance court efficiencies
and fairness, as creating or exacerbating the judiciary's problems rather
than easing them. There is, inevitably, a sense of diminished autonomy,
even though there has been no direct attack on the decisional independence of individual judges in specific cases. The judiciary's largely
decentralized and democratic governance structure, and its tradition of
great deference among all life-appointed colleagues, require it to arrive
at large decisions on the national level through painstaking consensus
building; it is for this reason an inherently conservative institution.' 9
Rapid innovation worked on the judiciary from the outside is inevitably
taken by some judges to be an overreaching abridgment of judicial
branch autonomy.
Judicial objections to invasions of their administrative independence
are not limited to actions by Congress or the Executive; they extend as
well to management from within the branch by non-Article III judges
and administrative employees."' One consequence is that effective
senior court administrators must accomplish their statutory duties
without arrogating, or appearing to arrogate, powers whose exercise
judges deem to be restricted to members of the life-tenured bench.'

109. See WHEELER & BERMANT, supra note 45, at 84-85.
110. For example, on June 16,1994, the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit resolved,
inter alia: "The existing governance structure of the federal judiciary places governance

authority of the federal courts (other than the Supreme Court) in designated Article III
judges of the courts of appeals and the district courts. That is a sensible placement of
authority and should not be altered. It is inappropriate for non-Article III officers to be
making governance decisions affecting Article III judges" (Resolution on file, the Federal
Judicial Center). Judges have objected strenuously to the proposal that the national level
ofjudicial branch governance would be organized under a "Chancellor" or "Executive judge"
with significantly more administrative authority than is now held by any single

administrator in the current governance structure, even though such an official would be
selected from the membership of the Article I1 bench. See Wheeler & Bermant, supranote
45. A trenchant attack on the "bureaucratization7 of federal judicial administration was
presented by Judge William G. Young at a Federal Judicial Center seminar on court
governance held in Washington, D.C. on March 3-4, 1994. An audio tape of Judge Youngs
comments is on file at the Federal Judicial Center.
111. The substantial responsibilities of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, for example, are given at 28 U.S.C. §§ 602-604 (1988). The Director is the
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Our final observation is more speculative. At any time, the judiciary
is in a dialogue or negotiation with the other branches about the short
term future of the courts: their budget, jurisdiction, size, and diverse
aspects of their procedural and administrative apparatus. The political
branches respond to electoral pressures by proposing and passing
legislation that gets into court either as a cause of action (e.g. new
federal criminal or regulatory statutes) or a procedural modification (e.g.
local expense and delay reduction plans that courts adopted pursuant to
the Civil Justice Reform Act) or administrative change (e.g. the
disciplinary provisions of the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980).'
We conjecture, perhaps too
crudely, that neither Congress nor the Executive wants to intervene in
procedural and administrative judicial branch affairs, for the simple
reason that there is so little political capital to be gained by the
intervention. Further, members of the United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate find impeachment and trial to be
substantial drains on their time, and they therefore resent them. 3
If the judiciary is perceived as imposing on itself very high standards of
accountability for official conduct, fiscal prudence, and efficient
operations, then the political branches have little incentive to initiate
additional procedural and administrative interventions." 4 They may
even have some incentive to divest themselves of controls, such as
managing courthouse construction, that are legacies of the time that the
courts had no administrative capability or autonomy.
The proposed long range plan recognizes this point when it says that
the judicial branch should achieve "effective coordination and review in

"administrative officer of the courts," 28 U.S.C. § 604(a), who is appointed and removable
by the Chief Justice of the United States after consultation with the Judicial Conference,
28 U.S.C. § 601 (1988), and who acts "under the supervision and direction of the Judicial
Conference," 28 U.S.C. § 604(a).
112. See supra notes 28-39.
113. See supra note 15, at 1.
114. Something of this idea was captured by Tennessee Congressman Walter Chandler,
a supporter of the 1939 Administrative Office Act:
Congress has created the inferior Federal courts and has the right to expect that
they will function efficiently and expeditiously, but Congress thus far has failed
to provide adequate administrative machinery whereby the best results will be
obtained from the Federal judicial system .... [The Administrative Office Act)
placed the responsibility for judicial administration where it belongs-with the
judiciary-and it will be an urge to the avoidance of the evils of judicial delays
that the citizens of the country know that the courts have in their power the
prompt and adequate disposition of pending cases.
Congressional Record, July 17, 1939, 76th Cong., 1st Seas. at 9310.
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budget formulation and execution.""5 The plan notes that the decentralized and collegial nature of court governance makes both more
difficult and more necessary a coordinated review of budget requests
from individual courts before they are aggregated for the single annual
submission to Congress-if the courts are not to be reviewed by the
Office of Management and Budget, then they should, the plan recommends, maintain a similar review function of their own.16
In the 1970s, an influential Senator, concerned that the judiciary was
not accepting what the Senator regarded as sufficient accountability for
actions within the branch that brought negative publicity to the courts,
emphasized that Congress would exercise more control over the courts
through "vigorous oversight. 117 A judicial branch that, as it were,
creates no problems for the political branches is certainly in a stronger
position to persuade them on at least some matters of substantial
interest to judges. In other words, there are trade-offs between branch
independence and individual judicial accountability that form the basis
of dialogue, usually indirect or implicit, between the judiciary and their
co-equal partners. The judiciary must of course approach these tradeoffs with care, because some problems between the branches are
inevitable and, in our system at least, appropriate." 8
VI.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion we review briefly the seven claims that are set out in
Section I.
1. "Judicialindependence" is an umbrella term covering several
partially overlapping categories of activity within judicial role and
judicial branch organization: decisional, personal, procedural, and

115.

PROPOSED PLAN, supra note 52, at 81.

116. Id. at 67. The plan points to the relatively new Economy Subcommittee of the
Judicial Conference Budget Committee as a recognition within court governance of the

importance of this function.
117.

The term was Senator DeConcini's in reference to the passage of the Judicial

Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94
Stat. 2035 (1980) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332(a), 332(c), 332(d), 371, 372, 604 (1976)).

The Senator had preferred another, stronger implementation of intra-branch disciplinary
process for the judiciary. See Edward D. Re, JudicialIndependenceandAccountability:The
JudicialCouncils and JudicialConduct and DisabilityAct of 1980, 8 N. KY. L. REV. 221,
251-55 (1981).
118. Each branch "should have a will of its own.' THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James
Madison). This argument is part of a more general discussion that goes beyond the scope
of this paper viz., whether branch independence is always a necessary condition for the
exercise of individual decisional independence. An argument against the need for such a

linkage is found in R.D. Nicholson, JudicialIndependenceandAccountability:Can they Coexist? 67 AUSTL. L.J. 404, 409-10 (1993).
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administrative. The utility of Judge Wallace's categories of judicial
independence seems beyond dispute. The categories establish a
framework within which natural distinctions emerge that would
otherwise be obscured and produce confusion in communication and
interpretation.
2. Decisionalindependence is the sine qua non of the judicialfunction.
There is nothing controversial about this claim. Disagreement is found
only among different opinions about how important other categories of
judicial independence are for maintaining decisional independence.
3. Federaljudges do not now generally believe that their decisional
independence is directly threatened from within or from outside of the
judicial branch. Neither the results of research conducted for the
National Commission on Judicial Discipline & Removal nor any other
source we are aware of provides facts or opinion to the effect that federal
judicial decision-making in individual cases is being unduly influenced
by positive or negative inducements from inside or outside of the judicial
branch. Where decisional independence has been compromised by
judicial misconduct, the impeachment process is deemed sufficient to
correct the problem.
4. Some federal judges are concerned that their procedural and
administrativeindependence are threatened by legislation and executive
intervention. Numerous examples are presented above to support this
claim. In this as in most matters, one can not expect complete
consensus among the members of the life-tenured federal bench. It is
important that judges within the leadership of the branch, acting in
their official capacities, have made this claim.
5. The argument that administrative independence is a necessary
conditionfor the exercise of decisional independence is a forceful one, but
support for it comes from sources other than the text of the Constitution
and the history of federal judicial administration. We have provided
historical information to show that the administrative independence of
the courts from the other branches was not a feature, in theory or fact,
of the original organization of the three branches. The progressive
amount of independence of the courts from the other branches was a
response to the growing size and complexity of court operations and to
the threat to decisional independence that many judges saw as a byproduct of external administration.
6. Concern over loss of administrativeand procedural independence
flows from the widespreadperception within the judicial branch that
federaljurisdictionand workload have grown so large that the historical
prestige and quality of the federal bench are at risk. We have not and
can not prove this claim beyond doubt, but the information presented
above does, in our view, establish its plausibility. There is no doubt that
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federal judges express concern about their workload and about congressional actions that limit judicial discretion while expanding federal
jurisdiction, and that they frequently cast their concern in terms of
judicial independence or loss of discretion. There is also little doubt
that, as the judiciary's budget grows it will come under more congressional and executive branch scrutiny. (It is also likely, if not inevitable,
that as the size of the courts grows, the amount of internal administrative machinery required to run them will increase in ways that are
objectionable to judges who cherish their individual administrative
autonomy highly.).
7. Efforts by the judicialbranch to sustainor increase its administrative and procedural independence is enhanced by internal organization
that emphasizes and displays strong within-branchaccountability. This
claim rests on the argument that there is little congressional or
executive branch incentive to micro-manage federal court administration
unless the courts present political issues that the political branches
cannot ignore. These issues are less likely to rise to that level of concern
if the courts do, and are seen to, demonstrate that everyone within the
system is subject to high standards of accountability. The judicial
branch may gain in administrative and procedural independence by clear
and consistent demonstration of intra-branch judicial accountability. It
is imperative, however, that the judicial branch not purchase increased
branch independence by exposing individual decisional independence to
undue oversight from within the judiciary's governance structure. That
trade-off would not be good for the judiciary or the nation.

